âWayne Wu, Movements of the Mind: A Theory of Attention, Intention and Action, Oxford University Press, 2023â
âThis book puts forward a theory of actionâ
âIt synthesises Wayne Wuâs extensive work on action and attention going back over a decade, and also substantially extends this foundationâ
âWuâs approach involves linking the theory of action to empirical work on working memory and attentionâ
âIn presenting a framework for thinking about action and attention, the book necessarily covers a lot of terrainâ
âFor Wu, action is most helpfully understood in terms of the âselection problemââ
âThis issue is faced by agents who have many potential inputs that could inform their actions, and many potential outputs. Here the âoutputsâ (which Wu calls âresponsesâ) may involve physical behaviour, or they may not. The challenge, for us as agents, is to link up (or âcoupleâ) the appropriate input with the appropriate responseâ
âThe space of potential inputs, potential responses, and possible couplings between them are what Wu calls a âbehaviour spaceââ
âIn previous work, Wu has referred to this kind of behaviour space as presenting a âmany-many problemâ (2011). There are many inputs, and many potential responses, and action involves selecting the correct path through this confusionâ
âThe coupling between input and response is influenced by the agentâs biases. Biases help to solve the selection problem, by helping to chart a path between input and responseâ
âAccording to Wu, an agentâs intentions are a form of bias, but there are others, which need not fit with the subjectâs intentionsâ
âWu claims that all action involves biases, and also that all action involves a certain amount of automaticityâ
âAttention is centre-stage in this theory of action. Wu relies on a taxonomy of attention that chops it up into three kinds: vigilance (the disposition to attend to a certain stimulus when it arises), attending (the action of paying attention to something) and attention-in-action (attentionâs role in guiding action)â
âSolving the selection problem involves taking an input and using it to inform (or guide) a response. For Wu, this kind of guidance from input to response is attention (63)â
âWu (somewhat briefly) links his picture to the celebrated âbiased competitionâ model of attention. According to this view, attention is the result of different neural mechanisms âcompetingâ with each other so that their information can be processed further. Given limited processing capacity in the brain, the bias part comes in when one neural mechanism is selected for further processing because its information is task-relevant (Desimone and Duncan 1995)â
âWu links his theory of action to empirical models of working memory (e.g., Baddeley and Logie 1999)â
âIt is a multi-component, short-term, limited capacity memory system, which stores and manipulates information in a variety of formatsâ
âThe currently dominant model of working memory includes subcomponents for linguistic and visual information, known as the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad respectively (Baddeley 2003)â
âAnother of the subcomponents of working memory is the central executive. The central executive is in charge of controlling the distribution of attention in order to ensure that it is directed to the appropriate stimuli to fulfil the task that the agent is undertakingâ
âHere is one of Wuâs most important claims: the central executive, which features in theories of working memory, is an empirical explication of the notion of intention (104â110)â
âThe psychological explication of this notion of intention (claims Wu) is to be found in working memoryâs central executive, since this faculty is what controls the allocation of attention to task-relevant stimuli. Wu then uses this picture to explain the role of intention in on-going actionâ
âUnderstanding intention in terms of the central executive can only be explanatory insofar as we have a grip on what the central executive is. Itâs easy to get a metaphorical grasp on the central executive. Itâs the boss of working memory: assigning attentional resources to the most relevant tasks. But what kind of grasp on the central executive do we have, beyond the metaphor?â
âWu is aware of this problem, commenting that some psychologists have expressed scepticism about the concept of a âcentral executiveâ. The essence of the worry is as follows. Postulating an âexecutiveâ in charge of guiding attention in working memory to task-relevant stimuli can feel a bit too much like the postulation of a homunculus (102)â
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