âGeorge Brechtâs Deck: A Fluxgame (1964) is a singular object, one that hovers between toy, game, and puzzle. It consists of playing cards printed with black-and-white images, collaged from encyclopedia drawings, diagrams, and photosâ
âThe subject matter is wide-ranging and comes from specialist domains: mechanics, optics, architecture, fluid dynamics, sport, etcâ
âThe sixty-four cards have neither suit nor number and, despite the suggestion of divisibility into eight groups of eight or four groups of sixteen, clear categories are wantingâ
âThe meaning of each individual card is a mystery. The collages often seem to generate thematic associations or visual puns, but they simultaneously resist such interpretationsâ
âInstead of looking for an interpreter, the cards need to be handled, to be spread out on a table and piled up, to be shuffled and dealtâ
âThe game includes no instructions, rules, or goals, and only the workâs title and materials suggests it is a game at all. Yet, the cards ask to be played with, even without any explanation of what that meansâ
âPeople invent all sorts of games with Deck, they collaborate to improvise stories and tell fortunes, they use the cards as prompts for performance, to inspire drawings, and much else. In Deck, one confronts the riddle-like character that pervades all of Brechtâs workâ
âDeck, and George Brechtâs art more generally links together chance, indeterminacy, and freedom through playâ
âGames provide such equipment in the form of dice, cards, coins, roulette wheels, lottery draws, and spinnersâ
âBrechtâs studies of probability theory and the philosophy of science were what first drew him into the orbit of contemporary artâ
âTrained as a chemist, Brecht spent the first fifteen years of his career with Pfizer and Johnson & Johnson, during which time he began experimenting with chance procedures in drawing and painting. A night class introduced Brecht to the methods of Dadaism and Surrealism, as well as the action painting of Jackson Pollock and the composition methods of John Cageâ
âHe began to correspond with Cage in 1956, and wrote an essay on chance methods in science and art the next year. When Cage offered a course in experimental composition at the New School for Social Research in 1959, Brecht jumped at the opportunity. Each week of this class, Cage would give a minimal and odd prompt for composition, and during the following week the class would perform and discuss the works that resultedâ
âBrecht met and collaborated with future members of Fluxus, an artistic movement of the 1960s that tried to merge art in everyday life. For many Fluxus artists, games, jokes, and toys were an ideal way to accomplish this goalâespecially when they were made in a skewed or disrupted mannerâ
âBrecht responds scientifically to such skepticism about chance. Since the rise of probabilistic thinking in the 19th century, the notion of strict causality has been untenable, and the theorems of Kurt Gödel and Werner Heisenberg show that uncertainty is the bedrock of realityâ
âGiving up control is always a relative procedure for Brecht, the production of a zone of unknowing that is partialâ
âBrechtâs vision of aleatory aesthetics, especially as it is articulated in âChance-Imagery,â is more systematic than many of his contemporariesâ
âYet, Brechtâs work undergoes a sudden change around 1961 because of a contradiction introduced by chance.9 After that date, the elaborately structured possibilities of his playing card works are paired down dramatically. He starts to write simple directions that sometimes amount to a single word and rarely stretch to more than a handfulâ
âIndeed, while actual cards remain important for his event scores, as in Water Yam (1963), their content no longer seem to instruct at all, but merely call attention to ongoing processes within the worldâ
âPieces, such as âDrip Music,â which in 1959 read âA source of dripping water and an empty vessel are arranged so that the water falls into the vessel,â are simplified to âSecond version: Dripping.â These works drop the programmatic and explicit tools for generating bias free randomness, and raise a question about the role of chance in Brechtâs methodâ
âIn a 1966 afterward to the belated publication of âChance-Imagery,â Brecht writes that he could not âhave foreseen the resolution of the distinction between choice and chance which was to occur in my own work.â10 Brecht was not worried about exerting a structuring control over the outcome of situations, but he did recognize that his scores imposed an alien will upon peopleâ
âCage said of one early piece that â[n]obody ever tried to control me so much,â and Brecht later reflected that he âlearned that lesson there, I realized I was being dictatorial.â12â
âBy moving from elaborate card pieces to brief and simple scores, Brecht solves this dilemma by leaving the realization of a given work up to the participantâ
âIn his notebooks Brecht invents the âenigmatic notion of âchoiceless choosingââ as a synthesis of each constraintâ
âChance continues to play a role in Brechtâs proto-minimalist events through the coincidence of word and world. He understands all sorts of everyday occurrences to fulfill the conditions for an event like âDripping,â without any need for a performer. Noticing a leaky faucet, a rainstorm, or sweat on a hot day all count as valid realizations of the scoreâ
âFor the observer, each is a random occurrence that just happens to coincide with the printed word, which makes the chance character explicitâ
âOther kinds of uncertainty are just as, or more, important to Brechtâs style. Brewing a pot of coffee as part of a morning routine, for instance, produces a âdrippingâ that is neither dictated nor random but habitualâ
âWith the reduction of chance operations, we might expect to see a similar decline in the toys and games that Brecht used to model chance. In fact, exactly the opposite occurs. Toys become a staple element of the assemblages and Fluxkits that Brecht created after 1962â
âHand puppets, tops, skipping rope, all kinds of balls, alphabet blocks, dominoes, chess pieces, and many more such objects appear throughout his work. Dice and cards persist, but without the one-to-one correspondence between card and instruction that characterized his early scoresâ
âBrecht also produced a series Fluxkits with George Maciunas that take games as an explicit theme. In the Games and Puzzles (1965) series, Brecht gives the player outlandish tasks that exacerbate the ambiguity of his simplified event scoresâ
âToys, games and puzzles thus continue to serve as models of uncertainty for Brecht, but in a sense that goes beyond chance. Unlike games of chance, puzzles are ordinarily determined: they have a right answer, and that answer becomes trivial and obvious after it has been solvedâ
âThis context helps illuminate the game of Deck that initially seems so hard to parse. Like Brechtâs early work with playing cards, Deck uses cards to highlight the effects of chance. After internalizing the problem of choiceless choice, Brecht does not instruct the player about how to play with Deck. The player must invite the game into her lifeâ
âIt is impossible to take in the whole of Deck at once, to try to make global claims about its meaning. So, a randomly dealt hand of cards becomes the ideal way of grasping, quite literally, a subset of Deck and making sense out of it. Chance thus becomes one moment within the larger movement of Brechtâs aesthetic of uncertaintyâ
âWe can trace the relation between chance and interpretation further by comparing Deck with its twin, Universal Machine II (1965). This was a work composed in the same year, and with the same set of encyclopedia imagery, which Brecht cut up again and re-arranged to make Deckâ
âIn Universal Machine II, the diagrams are condensed onto a single piece of paper, which has been glued onto the back of a wooden box. The box is covered by a sheet of glass, and contains some assorted objectsâbuttons, metal clips, an awl, or stonesâwhich are unique in each piece. On a facing cover are suggestions for using Universal Machine II, such as âFor a novel: / Shake the box. Open. Chapter 1. Close. / Shake the box. Open. Chapter 2. Closeâ or, âNew sciences. Determine two or more elements. Find out all you can about each element. Establish a science which treats of these elementsâ or, âNeed a friend? Shake box.ââ
âLike Deck, the act of shaking subordinates chance operations to a moment of interpretive uncertainty. Each time, a gestalt forms between the background images and a piece of debris, which draws a connection between two or more images in contingent and reciprocal waysâ
âUnlike Deck, though, Universal Machine II explicitly writes out its possible functions, and thereby draws attention to the meaning-making operationâ
âUniversal Machine II connects the most disparate things into a single universe of sense. By establishing chance relations between its objects, it produces an ontological flatteningâ
âDeck extends this operation, which the debris highlights, through a chance combination of cardsâ
âThe title of Universal Machine II calls attention to a universal flattening. At the same time, the title encodes a critical pun, one that sets up a contrast between Brechtâs work and the computational flattening of the universal Turing machineâ
âThe Turing machine, described by Alan Turing in 1936, is a theoretical model of a computer that describes how it is possible to build a machine that can perform any computation by reading instructions from a tape, and transforming those instructions according to a table of valuesâ
âone of Brechtâs commentators, Henry Martin, describes his work as âan enormous computer insofar as it accepts any and all information that one cycles into it.â23â
âHowever, with his transition away from instructions, Brechtâs work no longer establishes a universality through the computerâs ability to reduce the world into a series of calculable bits. In contrast to computation, Universal Machine II borrows a model of universal connection from the encyclopedia form, which establishes an aleatory and indeterminate connection between entriesâ
âThe invitation of the encyclopedic images and the chance structure of the cards allow Deck to make the transit from toy to puzzle to game, and back again. It gives the player a push and a hint, but does not give them a means or a map. It is rule-governed but without any rules, purposive without any purpose. Deck marks the most accomplished synthesis of Brechtâs thinking about chance, instructions, and uncertaintyâ
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