Khresis, Use

“As already suggested, in addition to the classical knowledge forms (theôrêtikê, poiêtikê, praktikê) both Plato and Aristotle work with another form of activity, competence, way of knowing, or knowledge form possible to distil from their writings. This is khrêsis, or use, different from both praxis and poíêsis in that it relates to externalised objects, but merely as instruments, not as material, i.e. with ambitions of only using them, without changing them in any way. In khrêsis instruments are used for purposes of the user beyond and outside the instruments themselves (the user’s ulterior or utilitarian motives). This means the instruments do no receive the main attention of the performer. It means that the real interest of khrêsis lies beyond any interests of or in the instruments themselves. Instruments are exchangeable and disposable, and they are evaluated according to their ability to satisfy the users’ ulterior motives or interests. As indicated in Chapter 3.1, most goods and most of the purely intellectual virtues are instruments that can be used for both good and evil ethico-political purposes. They need ethical and political direction. But external ethical instruction like this does not alter the basic and internal ethics or un-ethics implied in the relational structure of the different ways of knowing themselves. Nice, polite, and pleasant manipulation or use of other human beings as material or instruments is quite possible. But this does not alter the basic poíêsis and khrêsis relations of such activity.”