Being and Time pt. 2
âFor Aristotle, there is a science that investigates what he calls âbeing as suchâ, without regard to any specific realms of being, eg the being of living things (biology) or the being of the natural world (physics).â
âMetaphysics is the area of inquiry that Aristotle himself calls âfirst philosophyâ and which comes before anything else. It is the most abstract, universal and indefinable area of philosophy. But it is also the most fundamental.â
âFor Heidegger, what defines the human being is this capacity to be perplexed by the deepest and most enigmatic of questions: Why is there something rather than nothing? So, the task of Being and Time is reawakening in us a taste for perplexity, a taste for questioning.â
âQuestioning â Heidegger will opine much later in his career â is the piety of thinking.â
âThe first line of the text proper of Being and Time is, âWe are ourselves the entities to be analysedâ. This is the key to the crucial concept of mineness (Jemeinigkeit), with which the book begins: if I am the being for whom being is a question â âto be or not to beâ â then the question of being is mine to be, one way or another.â
âIn what, then, does the being of being human consist? Heideggerâs answer is existence (Existenz).â
âTherefore, the question of being is to be accessed by way of what Heidegger calls âan existential analyticâ.â
âBut what sort of thing is human existence? It is obviously defined by time: we are creatures with a past, who move through a present and who have available to them a series of possibilities, what Heidegger calls âways to beâ. Heideggerâs point here is wonderfully simple: the human being is not definable by a âwhatâ, like a table or a chair, but by a âwhoâ that is shaped by existence in time.â
âWhat it means to be human is to exists with a certain past, a personal and cultural history, and by an open series of possibilities that I can seize hold of or not.â
âThis brings us to a very important point: if the being of being human is defined by mineness, then my being is not a matter of indifference to me. A table or chair cannot recite Hamletâs soliloquy or undergo the experience of self-questioning and self-doubt that such words express. But we can.â
âThis is the kernel of Heideggerâs idea of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit), which more accurately expresses what is proper to the human being, what is its own.â
âFor Heidegger, there are two dominant modes of being human: authenticity and inauthenticity. Furthermore, we have a choice to make between these two modes: the choice is whether to be oneself or not to be oneself, to be author of oneself and self-authorising or not.â
âNote the radical nature of this initial move: philosophy is not some otherworldly speculation as to whether the external world exists or whether the other human-looking creatures around me are really human and not robots or some such. Rather, philosophy begins with the description â what Heidegger calls âphenomenologyâ â of human beings in their average everyday existence. It seeks to derive certain common structures from that everydayness.â
âHeidegger seeks to describe the human being as it presented âmost closely and mostlyâ (Zunächst und Zumeist).â
Navigation
Backlinks
There are no backlinks to this post.