âTheory has detached itself from experiment. The objects of theoretical speculation are now too far away, too small, too energetic or too far in the past to reach or rule out with our earthly instruments.â
âToday, most physicists judge the soundness of a theory by using the Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popperâs rule of thumb. In the 1930s, Popper drew a line between science and non-science in comparing the work of Albert Einstein with that of Sigmund Freud. Einsteinâs theory of general relativity, which cast the force of gravity as curves in space and time, made risky predictionsâones that, if they hadnât succeeded so brilliantly, would have failed miserably, falsifying the theory. But Freudian psychoanalysis was slippery: Any fault of your motherâs could be worked into your diagnosis. The theory wasnât falsifiable, and so, Popper decided, it wasnât science.â
âPhysicistsâ preoccupation with Popper âis really something that needs to stop,â Pigliucci said. âWe need to talk about current philosophy of science. We donât talk about something that was current 50 years ago.ââ
âPopperian falsificationism has been supplanted by Bayesian confirmation theory, or Bayesianism, a modern framework based on the 18th-century probability theory of the English statistician and minister Thomas Bayes. Bayesianism allows for the fact that modern scientific theories typically make claims far beyond what can be directly observedâno one has ever seen an atomâand so todayâs theories often resist a falsified-unfalsified dichotomy. Instead, trust in a theory often falls somewhere along a continuum, sliding up or down between 0 and 100 percent as new information becomes available. âThe Bayesian framework is much more flexibleâ than Popperâs theory, said Stephan Hartmann, a Bayesian philosopher at LMU. âIt also connects nicely to the psychology of reasoning.ââ
âthe 19th-century vortex theory of atoms. This âVictorian theory of everything,â developed by the Scots Peter Tait and Lord Kelvin, postulated that atoms are microscopic vortexes in the ether, the fluid medium that was believed at the time to fill space. Hydrogen, oxygen, and all other atoms were, deep down, just different types of vortical knots. At first, the theory âseemed to be highly promising,â Kragh said. âPeople were fascinated by the richness of the mathematics, which could keep mathematicians busy for centuries, as was said at the time.â Alas, atoms are not vortexes, the ether does not exist, and theoretical beauty is not always truth.â
âExcept sometimes it is. Rationalism guided Einstein toward his theory of relativity, which he believed in wholeheartedly on rational grounds before it was ever tested. âI hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed,â Einstein said in 1933, years after his theory had been confirmed by observations of starlight bending around the sun.â
âThe question for the philosophers is: Without experiments, is there any way to distinguish between the non-empirical virtues of vortex theory and those of Einsteinâs theory? Can we ever really trust a theory on non-empirical grounds?â
âPopper called speculation that did not yield testable predictions âmetaphysics,â but he considered such activity worthwhile, since it might become testable in the future.â
âThis was true of atomic theory, which many 19th-century physicists feared would never be empirically confirmed. âPopper was not a naive Popperian,â Kragh said. âIf a theory is not falsifiable,â Kragh said, channeling Popper, âit should not be given up. We have to wait.ââ
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