âPretty much every metaphor designer is inspired by Metaphors We Live By (1980), by the Berkeley linguist George Lakoff and the philosopher Mark Johnson at the University of Oregon. Itâs the classic look at how metaphors structure the way we think and talk, and once youâve read it, you canât help but agree that, at a conceptual level, life is a journey, and arguments are wars (you take sides, there can be only one winner, evidence is a weapon).â
âIt was the Princeton psycholinguist Sam Glucksberg who in 2003 argued that metaphors are really categorisation proposals. Provocations, you might call them. Youâre suggesting that one thing belongs with another.â
âWords such as âpumpâ and âsharkâ arenât just the names of individual things; they also speak to generalities. They have what Glucksberg calls âdual referenceâ. He points out others that have become conventionalised metaphors. âButcherâ refers to âanyone who should be skilled but is incompetentâ, âjailâ to âany unpleasant, confining situationâ, âEnronâ to âany dramatic accounting scandalâ, and âVietnamâ to any âdisastrous military interventionâ.â
âAn alternative theory comes from the psycholinguist Dedre Gentner at Northwestern University in Illinois, who describes metaphor as a âmappingâ between two concepts. On this view, understanding comes about in two steps. In the first, the most obvious shared structural properties between the concepts are matched. In Schönâs paintbrush metaphor, whatâs matched up is that pumps move liquids and so do paintbrushes. In the second step, other comparisons are made. Thatâs when the researchers wondered if the empty spaces between the brushâs bristles might be as crucial to paint delivery as the vacuum of a pump is to water movement. (They are.)â
âThese two competing theories pose a question: do people interpret new metaphors more easily when the comparison between two domains is apt â that is, when the two elements seem to fit with each other? âLove is a treeâ might be an example of an apt metaphor, whereas âa child is a machineâ seems less so. Why is that? Perhaps itâs because, at a conceptual level, love is easily seen as something organic and sheltering, whereas putting machines and children together in one image triggers conceptual dissonance. (Iâve certainly found that people donât like that pairing.) Or do we grasp metaphors more readily when at least one of the concepts is very familiar? This question suggests a further one: to what degree is the aptness that you perceive in the metaphor just a measure of how long itâs been around?â
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